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1. Introduction 
 
 Following the success of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, a large number of 
institutions all over the world have replicated the “Grameen model”: group lending or 
joint liability. During the last decade, however, some institutions have departed from 
group lending schemes. Even the Grameen Bank itself shifted to a new system known 
as Grameen II in 2002 and discarded joint liability schemes. 
In 2005, The Economist(2005) drew attention to recent developments in 
microfinance and noted that a growing number of the institutions had discovered 
limitations of the group-lending model. The article pointed out that the members who 
expanded their businesses faster and required more capital felt constrained in what they 
could borrow, while those whose businesses grew more slowly found themselves 
guaranteeing big debts for other people. Besides, as group members developed personal 
credit histories through their loan payments, the need for collective guarantees 
disappeared. 
 In the 1990s, most theoretical work focused on how joint liability lending can 
mitigate the problems of moral hazard (Stiglitz (1990), Varian (1990), Banerjee, Besley 
and Guinnane (1994)), adverse selection (Ghatak (1999), Tassel (1999)), and strategic 
defaults (Besley and Coate (1995), Armendáriz de Aghion (1999)). These studies 
attempted to clarify why group lending had succeeded in collecting money from the 
poor people who had been considered too poor to repay their loans while other 
traditional government banks lending money to the farmers and the poor with low 
interest rates had suffered high default rates. 
Recently, light has been shed on factors other than joint liability as contributors 
to the success of microfinance in maintaining high repayment rates. Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch (2000, 2005) argue that joint liability is just one element in 
successful microfinance schemes and consider other important aspects of microfinance 
success thus far, including dynamic incentives,1 frequent repayment installments2 and 
                                                 
1 Dynamic incentives mean that the banks make future loan accessibility contingent on full repayment of 
the current loan in order to deter the borrowers from defaulting strategically. 
2 In many microfinance schemes, loan repayments are made weekly, biweekly or monthly. By meeting 
frequently, loan officers can obtain information on the borrowers and can find out problematic borrowers 
or projects early enough to take necessary action to solve them. Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 
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public repayments. 3  Chowdhury (2005) illustrates the importance of dynamic 
incentives in microfinance programs and shows that without dynamic incentives, group-
lending schemes may involve under-monitoring with the borrowers investing in 
undesirable projects. Che (2002) points out that joint liability schemes create a free-
riding problem and worsen the repayment rate, but when the projects are repeated many 
times over, joint liability becomes more attractive than individual lending. Rai and 
Sjöström (2004) stress the importance of cross-reporting in achieving efficiency in 
group lending. 
In this study, we challenge the validity of the argument that joint liability 
contracts are better incentive schemes insofar as they discourage borrowers from 
defaulting strategically and achieve higher repayment rates than individual lending 
contracts. We implemented eleven different types of repayment game with dynamic 
incentives in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Our results show that joint liability contracts 
caused serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment 
rates. When group members observed each others’ investment returns, participants were 
more likely to opt for strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system 
or punitive measures among borrowers, the default rates and the ratio of participants 
who chose strategic default under joint liability remained higher than those under 
individual lending. In our games, joint liability contracts themselves do not seem to 
provide good incentives for borrowers to repay their loans. Moreover, joint liability 
schemes failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been 
helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default 
strategically and repay a little again in the current round, while those who paid large 
amounts were always the same individuals. 
                                                                                                                                               
(2005) also argue that for borrowers who have difficulty in holding on to income (for instance, when 
neighbors and relatives drop by for handouts or when husbands take out the money to buy liquor), 
frequent repayment schedules help them to take the money out of the house soon after it is earned. 
3 Loan officers come to villages on a weekly, biweekly or monthly basis, and meet with borrowers. At 
these meetings, borrowers repay thier installments in public, a practice that strengthens the social stigma 
against not repaying the loan promptly. Group meetings also reduce microlenders’ transaction costs to 
elicit information on problematic borrowers or projects from their group members. Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch (2005) report that the Grameen Bank still runs group meetings and makes public 
repayments even after it shifts from joint liability lending to individual lending. 
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Our study is largely inspired by Gine, Pamela, Karlan and Morduch (2005), who 
conducted experimental surveys of investment games4 in Peru and who found that 
dynamic incentives are powerful in reducing moral hazard, while the joint liability 
mechanisms create a free-riding problem, inducing borrowers to choose riskier 
investment. They also found that allowing participants to form groups by themselves, 
which is often the case with real microfinance schemes, helps to mitigate the free-riding 
problem. We also conducted games where participants were allowed to choose their 
group members. We found that allowing self group formation has a significantly 
positive effect on reducing strategic default. But once we control individual constant 
effects by using the fixed effect model, then the significance disappears. 
Field experiments to consider repayment behavior in microfinance have also 
been conducted by Cassar, Crowley and Wydick (2005). They conducted repeated 
public good games, which incorporated joint liability and dynamic incentives, in South 
Africa and Armenia, to investigate the role of social ties in group lending. They also 
related participants’ behavior in public good games to that in trust games. The structure 
of their games is based on Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002), who conducted an 
experimental study at the University of Erfurt, Germany, and who found that there is 
little difference in outcomes between self-formed groups and randomly matched groups. 
While these studies focus on the roles of social ties and other demographic factors in 
microfinance, our study focuses on the effects of different microfinance schemes on 
borrowers’ repayment behavior. 
Several empirical studies have tried to clarify which factors have a positive 
effect on higher repayment rates.5 It is, however, almost impossible to empirically test 
whether joint liability lending is a better enforcement mechanism than individual 
lending with the following two reasons. 
The first is endogeneous sample selection bias. Since participation in 
microfinance is voluntary, the characteristics of the joint liability lending borrowers can 
differ from those of individual lending borrowers. Tassel (1999) shows that lenders can 
                                                 
4 In their experiments, they conducted eleven different manipulations and asked the participants whether 
they invested their capital in risky projects or in safe projects. Their focus was on whether joint liability 
contracts reduce moral hazard behavior (choosing risky projects), while our study focuses on whether or 
not joint liability can reduce strategic defaults. 
5 For example, see Ahlin and Townsend (2003, 2005), Karlan (2005b), and Wydick (1999). 
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screen agent types by offering them joint liability lending and individual lending: high-
ability agents prefer joint liability contracts while low-ability agents choose individual 
lending contracts. If this argument is true, higher repayment rates under joint liability 
than those under individual lending do not necessarily mean that joint liability is a better 
enforcement scheme. They may merely reflect sampling bias: only high-ability 
borrowers choose joint liability, which results in higher repayment rates. Gomez and 
Santor (2003) have investigated two Canadian microlenders and find that quite different 
types of people choose joint liability lending over individual lending. In order to deal 
with the self-selection problem, they used the propensity score matching method and 
showed that joint liability induced higher repayment rates even after controlling the 
sample selection bias. As Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) argue, however, 
if there are important variables omitted from the first stage equation, then this method 
ceases to guarantee consistent estimates. Another solution might be to use randomized 
experiments. But as participation in microfinance is voluntary, we would ideally need to 
compel the subjects to participate in the offered microfinance schemes.6 We would also 
need to ensure that there are no other microfinance providers in the area concerned. 
Further, since types of lending also influence borrowers’ investment decisions and their 
level of effort, we would also need information on how risky the borrowers’ 
investments were and how effectively they worked. Without observable variables 
measuring the riskiness of the investments and the effort levels involved, we cannot 
consistently estimate the effect of joint liability on borrowers’ repayment decisions. 
The second reason is that empirical studies do not really allow us to distinguish 
whether a borrower defaults strategically or because of insufficient funds. Borrowers 
who defaulted strategically would report that their business failed in fear of being 
considered unfaithful or the bank knowing this information. Even though we can know 
their actual investment returns, they might report that they faced emergency expenses, 
of a kind the researcher cannot observe. 
 Therefore, the best way to investigate the effects of different microfinance 
lending schemes on repayment decisions would be to conduct an experimental survey in 
                                                 
6 An important study which solves this problem is Gine and Karlan (2006). They randomly assigned pre-
existing joint liability “centers” to individual lending centers and find out that this conversion to 
individual lending does not change the repayment rate. While they focus on the observable repayment 
desision, our research focus on usually unobservable strategic default decision. 
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which the subjects are poor people who are the targets of microfinance programs and 
investment returns are determined randomly. We conducted eleven different 
microfinance games in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam and we have found that joint 
liability contracts induced borrowers to choose strategic default and caused a lowering 
of repayment rates. 
 In the following section, we describe the experimental design of the project. 
Section three provides our empirical results and section four offers concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Experimental Design 
 
Locations 
 We conducted our experimental study in Ho Chi Minh City, the largest city in 
Vietnam. After the introduction of doi moi (meaning renovation) in 1986, the 
Vietnamese economy moved from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented 
one, a transition that has brought about rapid economic growth especially during the last 
15 years. Ho Chi Minh City has been the center of Vietnam’s economic development, 
mainly as a result of the expansion of the private sector and large inflows of foreign 
direct investment. 
Income disparity between Ho Chi Minh City and other areas, especially rural 
areas, has been so conspicuous that a great number of people have migrated to Ho Chi 
Minh City to earn money, even though the Vietnamese government has taken various 
measures to discourage rural people from rushing to the city. For example, children  
from outside are not allowed to enter public primary and secondary schools in Ho Chi 
Minh City. Individuals migrating to the city despite the restrictions are not registered 
and not counted in the official statistics. Most of the poor people in the city are illegal 
immigrants of this kind. Their presence in the city contradicts the Government official 
statistics, according to which all people in Ho Chi Minh City live above the poverty line. 
Major microfinance providers in Vietnam are state banks, state-controlled mass 
organizations and International NGOs. For loans higher than a certain amount (about 10 
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million VND7), collateral-based individual lending is employed while below this level, 
formal financial providers use group lending. It should be noted that group lending does 
not necessarily mean joint liability lending.8 For example, CEP (Capital Aid Fund for 
Employment of the Poor), a semi-formal microfinance provider, engages in group 
lending without joint liability. When interviewed, CEP officials said that borrowers’ 
groups were used only to collect loan applications, to collect regular installments and to 
disseminate information so as to reduce lenders’ transaction costs. Only in cases where 
borrowers are found to have defaulted strategically, are other group members penalised. 
Many borrowers whom we interviewed, however, did not monitor each other. Okae 
(2002) investigated microfinance in northern rural villages and found that almost all 
borrowers from the state banks did not realize that they were liable for other members’ 
loans and did not have any bank savings. He also observed that two households 
borrowed money from a bank to repay the loans of another bank. In Vietnam, 
microfinance has been popular but joint liability schemes seem not to be well executed. 
We set up our experimental labs9 in three districts, District 10, District Binh 
Thanh and District Tan Binh, in Ho Chi Minh City, in locations close to local markets 
and inhabited by many immigrants. We recruited participants on the streets and at the 
markets near our labs. We also asked participants to invite their neighbors and friends to 
participate in our experiments. We conducted our survey in three districts so as to avoid 
individuals participating many times over, and in order to ensure that our samples were 
varied enough to reflect the character of the population. 
 Before the experiments began, participants filled out the questionnaires 
including questions related to demographic characteristics, education, occupation, and 
experiences in borrowing money. We also asked three attitudinal questions from the 
General Society Survey (GSS) that relate to trust, which are also used in Cassar, 
                                                 
7 1US$=15,900~15,910VND (Vietnamese dong) in our research period. A daily wage of unskilled 
workers in Ho Chi Minh City were 20,000 ~ 30,000VND. 
8 Duong and Izumida (2002) classify the lending groups of the Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development into joint liability groups (with joint liability) and joint borrowing groups (without 
joint liability). However, they did not find any cases where other members of joint liability groups repaid 
a defaulting member’s loan. 
9 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)). 
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Crowley and Wydick (2005) and Karlan (2005a)10 and five questions measuring the 
cooperation scale as used by Carpenter, Daniere and Takahashi (2004).11 
As we point out below, repayment decisions can be dependent on risk attitudes. 
Thus in the questionnaire, in order to measure their risk attitudes, we also asked 
respondents to choose one of the following five lotteries: (1) paid 10,500VND or 
9,500VND with equal probability; (2) paid 14,000VND or 7,000VND with equal 
probability; (3) paid 17,000VND or 5,000VND with equal probability; (4) paid 
21,000VND or 3,000VND with equal probability; and (5) paid 24,000VND or nothing 
with equal probability. If we assume a CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility 
function, u(x)=x1-r, where x is the amount of money obtained and r is the relative risk 
aversion coefficient, then (1) is optimal for the individuals with r>0.85, (2) is optimal 
for the individuals with r in (0.43, 0.85), (3) is optimal for the individuals r in (0.26, 
0.43), (4) is optimal for the individuals r in (0.09, 0.26) and (5) is optimal for the 
individuals with r>0.09. After the all games were completed, we rolled a die for each 
participant. If the cast of the die was 4, 5 or 6, then the participants would be able 
receive the larger amounts of money of their lottery choice. If the cast of the die was 1, 
2, or 3, they would be able to receive the smaller ones. 
After the all participants filled out the questionnaire, we conducted a social 
networks survey of the kind carried out by Gine, Pamela, Karlan and Morduch (2005). 
We had participants stand up one at a time. While participant J was standing, other 
participants were asked on the computers if they knew participant J’s name, if they 
knew her hometown, if they knew where she lived or where she worked, if they often 
talked with her, and how they would describe their relationship with her. We then used 
the information provided by the answers to create a social connection index for each 
individual. We conducted this social networks survey before the microfinance games 
with the purpose of enabling the participants to gain familiarity with the computers that 
                                                 
10 The three GSS question were as follows. (1) Trust question: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you can't be to careful in dealing with people?” (2) Fairness question: 
“Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to 
be fair?” (3) Helpfulness question: “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that 
they are mostly just looking out for themselves?”. 
11 These questions ask the participants if they agree with the following five statements: (1) It is better to 
cooperate than compete; (2) People should listen to their conscience when making decisions; (3) People 
should forgive others when they are angry; (4) It is amusing to play tricks on other people; and (5) People 
should right the wrongs that are done to them. 
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were to be used throughout this session, our subjects being poor people some of whom 
had never before used computers. As we expected, almost all the participants learned 
how to use computers by means of this session and were able to play the subsequent 
microfinance games without our help. Some of them, however, needed our assistants’ 
advice either because they were illiterate or because their eyesight was too poor for 
them to see letters on their screens. In such cases, the assistant explained to them what 
was written the screen asked them to make their choice being careful not to pose any 
leading questions.12 
 
Microfinance games 
The purpose of the games is to investigate how lending schemes and 
environmental factors affect borrowers’ repayment behavior. In total, we conducted 
eleven different manipulations of the kind described below. In all of the games, we 
incorporated the dynamic incentive mechanism that is usually employed by 
microfinance institutions. If individuals or groups cannot repay their loans, then they 
cannot play in any further rounds in that game. The wealth accumulated in previous 
rounds cannot be used to repay the current round’s loan. It should be noted that even if 
the participants are able to repay their loans, the games are supposed to finish at this 
round with a probability of 5/6. We told the participants that we would roll a die at the 
end of every round and if, and only if, the cast of the die was one would the game finish. 
If the cast of the die was higher than one, those who repaid their loans continued 
playing in the next round. 
The benchmark games are individual lending games. In each round, participants 
receive “loans” of 3 million points to invest in risky projects whose returns are random, 
varying from 0 to 9 million points in increments of 1 million points with equal 
probability.13 Each participant simply decides whether he/she will repay his/her own 
                                                 
12 In the pre-tests, the assistants often asked leading questions. I carefully listened to the way in which 
they explained matters and asked their questions, and repeatedly cautioned them to avoid asking leading 
questions. We organized pre-tests seven times so that the assisitants fully understood the structure of the 
games and how they should treat the participants. 
13 Since the maximum loan size provided by microfinance organizations in Vietnam is broadly speaking 
from 1.5 million to 3 million VND (100~200US$), we set the loan size in our experiment at 3 million to 
help the participants to readily imagine the circumstances. 
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loan of 3 million points after receiving the return. If the returns are less than 3 million 
points, then the participants have no choice but to default. 
We will now look at the borrowers’ repayment behavior in rather more formal 
terms. Let θt be the investment return from the project at round t. Since the probability 
that the game continues after any given round is equal to 5/6, the individual’s expected 
payoff at round t, EUt , can be expressed by 
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where u( · ) is an individual’s utility function, R( · ) is an individual’s repayment 
decision function, and Pr(θ= tθ~ ) is equal to 1/10 for every tθ~ . The last term 
∏−= ++11 )~(ij jtjtR θ is equal to one if this individual did not default until round t+i and zero 
otherwise. 
 Note that the individual’s decision problems have the same structure in every 
period. Thus we can reduce the individual repayment decision problem to the decision 
problem on the threshold investment return level θH, where he/she would repay the loan 
if his/her investment return θ is no less than θH and not repay otherwise. Then the 
borrower’s maximization problem can be expressed as 
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where I(θ≥θH) takes the value of 1 when θ≥θH and zero otherwise. Numerical calculation 
shows that it is optimal for any individuals with CRRA utility functions to set θH equal 
to three regardless of risk-averseness: whenever the investment returns are no less than 
the amount of the loans, individuals choose to repay the loans.14 
                                                 
14 If we changed the amount of the loan from 3 million points to 4 million points with the same 
investment return levels, individuals would choose to repay the loans if their relative risk aversion 
coefficient were r>0.39 and would not repay otherwise. Besley and Coate (1995) show that joint liability 
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Throughout the research project, our central interest was to examine how 
borrowers’ behavior changes when joint liability is introduced and other changes occur 
in the structure of the game. To do this, we ran another ten different manipulations, as 
described below. Table 1 provides summary tabulations for each game. Usually, 
participants played three to five microfinance games in one session. We tried to make 
the order of playing the games vary so as to avoid cases where the players’ behavior in a 
certain game differed from that in another game, not because the incentive structure is 
different but because one was always played earlier and another later. One session, 
including filling out the questionnaires and conducting social networks survey, lasted 
for two and a half hours. 
Participants were told that every 1 million points would convert to 1000VND. 
They were also paid the prizes of the lottery described in the previous subsection. All 
payouts were made after all the games were completed. Participants received 
36,000VND (about 2.3US$) on average, which is equivalent to one-and-a-half-day’s  
earnings for a street vendor. We set the award level relatively low so that rich people 
would have less incentive to participate in our experiment and in order to ensure that 
only poor people, who are the targets of most microfinance programs, would take part. 
All rules were explained to all members in public, using large poster boards. No 
written instructions were provided. We let them play for a practice period during which 
the investment returns were 7 million points for every participant and another practice 
period where every participant received investment returns of 1 million points before 
the game started. 
 
Joint liability 
Every participant was allocated to a group of four individuals but he/she did not 
know who would be in his/her group, nor would they be told at the end. The group was 
liable to repay a total amount of 12 million points. If the group could not repay this 
amount, then none of the group members was allowed to play in further rounds of the 
                                                                                                                                               
can achieve higher repayment rates than individual lending when the interest rates are low and in our 
cases the low interest rates correspond to the small amount of the loan since the distribution of investment 
returns is fixed. As our purpose in this study is to challenge the validity of the argument that joint liability 
contracts can reduce strategic default, we decided to set the amount of the loans at 3 million points rather 
than 4 million points in order to make games’ environment favorable to joint liability lending. 
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game concerned. Information on the individual’s investment return was kept private so 
that no other members of the group could ascertain whether a group member defaulted 
strategically or merely because of project failure. 
After receiving the investment returns, participants were asked whether they 
wished to repay their own loans of 3 million points if the investment returns were no 
less than 3 million points. Unlike Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) and Cassar, 
Crowley and Wydick (2005),15 if the investment returns were less than 3 million points 
or individuals chose not to repay 3 million points while their investment returns were no 
less than 3 million points, then they were asked how many points they were willing to 
contribute to the group. If there were any members who did not repay 3 million points, 
then the members who had repaid 3 million points were informed how many members 
had not repaid their own loans and were asked how many more points they were willing 
to contribute to the group to make up the outstanding debts of the other members. If the 
sum of the additional contribution exceeded the deficit, the surplus points were returned 
to those who contributed additional points in proportion to their additional 
contribution.16 This modification made the games more similar to actual joint liability 
schemes and allowed borrowers to choose the amount of their repayments. Since the 
banks cannot observe their borrowers’ investment returns,17 they only can collect the 
amount of the money the borrowers report. 
At the end of each round, participants were able to see their group’s total 
repayment amount and could decide whether or not their groups could continue playing 
in the subsequent rounds. But they could not know how many points each member had 
contributed. 
In games of this kind, since participants repeatedly interact with the same 
members in subsequent rounds of the game, there exists a cooperative equilibrium 
                                                 
15 In their settings, the repayment amount of the borrowers who chose to repay is automatically 
determined by the number of the borrowers in their groups who chose to repay. 
16 For example, consider the case where the deficit is 2 million points and members A and B chose to 
additionally contribute 2 million points and 1 million points respectively, resulting in a total additional 
contrinbution of 3 millions. In this case, the actual repayment of A and B is two-thirds of the amount of 
their additional contribution. 
17 In the experiments of Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) and Cassar, Crowley and Wydick (2005), 
investment returns only take two variables, namely failure or success. In such cases, the bank can know 
the amount of the borrowers’ investment returns once the bank observes that the borrowers choose to 
repay. 
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where each member chooses to repay the loan. On the other hand, if members do not 
take into account the payoffs in the subsequent rounds or if they believe that the other 
members will choose not to repay and that there will be no further rounds, then they will 
choose not to repay their loans. The individuals’ belief in other members’ behavior, as 
well as their propensity to free-ride and their risk-attitude, determine which equilibrium 
is achieved. 
Before beginning the experiments, we let participants play a practice period in 
which the investment returns were 7 million points for every participant and another 
practice period where every participant received investment returns of 1 million points, 
as explained above. In the practice periods, all the participants were matched with the 
pre-programmed computers whose behavior was totally identical for every participant 
so that any difference in individuals’ behavior was not be attributable to differences in 
the other group members’ behavior in the practice periods. 
It should be noted that the groups were dissolved after each game finished. 
Participants were newly matched with other participants when they played new games. 
 
Knowing members’ repayments 
 A distinguishing feature of the joint liability games described above is that 
borrowers cannot observe how many points other group have members repaid. But we 
also labelled each member in the group and allowed them to observe each other’s 
repayment at the end of each round. 
Unless this game was played after other joint liability games, participants played 
practice periods as described above. This is true for the following manipulations. 
 
Monitoring 
If the other group members are neighbors or work in the same places, they might 
be able to monitor each other’s income. Here we allow each participant to monitor the 
other group members’ investment returns. Monitoring is cost-free and automatic. In this 
game, participants can know whether group members defaulted strategically or 
defaulted owing to a failure in their investment. 
 
Cross-reporting 
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 Rai and Sjöström (2004) argue that joint liability is not enough to efficiently 
induce borrowers to help each other and that when borrowers share information about 
productivity shocks that the bank does not possess, efficiency requires that borrowers 
send reports about each other to the bank. They build a simple two-borrowers model 
and construct an efficient cross-reporting mechanism. 
 Their mechanism was, however, too complicated to implement in our simple 
dynamic incentive schemes. On the other hand, their model was too simplified to 
replicate in our experiment. For example investment returns take only two values. It is 
not clear what the efficient cross-reporting mechanism will be when there are four 
borrowers. 
 We therefore used cross-reporting in a different way from Rai and Sjöström 
(2004). In our experiment, participants were asked to report any member who had a 
sufficient investment return but did not pay his/her own loan. If a member was reported 
by more than one member, then he/she would be automatically excluded from the group 
and would not be allowed to play any further rounds in that game. For risk-neutral 
individuals, the loss of being excluded was equivalent to 4.8 million points. 
 
Penalties 
 Besley and Coate (1995) point out the importance of social sanctions as a means 
of ensuring high repayment rates in group lending schemes. They argue that if social 
sanctions are sufficiently great, then the repayment rates under group lending exceed 
those under individual lending. In the experiments, we implemented games that 
incorporated penalties, with two different sanction levels, 1.5 million points and 3 
million points. In these games, participants were asked whether there were any 
members whom they want to penalize. If more than one member agreed to penalize a 
certain member, then a penalty of either 1.5 or 3 million points was subtracted from the 
final amount awarded to the person being penalized. 
 The cross-reporting mechanism described above, and the mechanism for 
administering penalties, have a similar effect in the sense that both mechanisms penalize 
those who have played uncooperatively and selfishly. But in the games equipped with 
penalizing mechanisms, participants still have to play with members who have not 
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played cooperatively while in the cross-reporting games they can exclude such members 
completely. 
 
Introducing voluntary transfer among group members in individual lending 
 Though Besley and Coate (1995) and Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002)  
compare the repayment rates under basic individual lending and group lending, this 
comparison may not be fair since in the latter category, players can share the risk among 
the members but in the former, players have no means of coping with risk. In the real 
world, people might enter side contracts with relatives and neighbors so as to cope with 
income shocks (see Townsend (1994) and Udry (1994) for evidence of risk-sharing - 
though imperfect - in rural villages). Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) point out that if the 
group maximizes joint welfare, then members will always share net incomes and be 
voluntarily jointly liable for each other’s loans regardless of whether the formal terms 
are those of joint or individual liability. Rai and Sjöström (2004) also argue that if the 
borrowers can sign binding ex ante side contracts, then individual loans and joint 
liability loans are both efficient and result in the same outcome. They also argue that 
when borrowers cannot write such state-contingent side contracts ex ante but are able to 
write binding interim side contracts after having observed the state of the world, then 
any efficient mechanisms must rely on cross-reports. 
In order to allow for such side contracts among borrowers, we conducted 
individual lending games with groups where participants could transfer their points to 
unsuccessful members in their groups but they were not liable for the other members’ 
loans. They were informed of their own and the other members’ investment returns at 
the beginning of the rounds and decided whether and how many points they would 
transfer to whom. Unsuccessful members could not ask successful members to transfer 
points to them. Moreover, we did not impose any enforcement mechanism for ensuring 
that those who lent points would collect those points in subsequent rounds. Therefore 
lending points in this game was totally voluntary and represented the weakest type of 
side contracts among borrowers. Each member was able to observe whether other 
members repaid their own loans or not. The other rules were  the same as in the 
individual lending games. 
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 The information structure of this game corresponds to joint liability games with 
monitoring where each member knows the other members’ repayments. We can judge 
whether individual lending or joint liability lending results in higher repayment rates by 
comparing these two different games. 
 
Communication 
In the games described earlier in the paper, participants could not know who 
their group members were. We introduced face-to-face communication into joint 
liability games, so as to shed light on the role of communication to induce coordination 
and altruistic behavior. 
 
Group formation 
As Gine, Pamela, Karlan and Morduch (2005) argue, cooperation is easier to 
achieve with self-formed groups. We examine how the introduction of self group 
formation affects repayment rates. 
Ghatak (1999) stresses the role of group formation in group lending, arguing that 
borrowers form groups with same type of borrowers. But this adverse selection 
experience would have relevance for repayment rates only when risky or easy-to-be-
tempted-to-free-ride individuals were to be excluded from the games. As all individuals 
were allowed to participate in our games, the changes in repayment rates in our 
experiment (especially in the first round) cannot be explained by such adverse selection 
models. 
 
 
3. Experimental Results 
 
Table 2 shows the numbers of players, ratios of the groups (or individuals in the 
case of the individual lending games) who ended in default, and ratios of the individuals 
who defaulted strategically in the eleven different games. Strategic default refers to 
cases where individuals obtained investment returns of over 3 million points but repaid 
less than 3 million points. 
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The table shows that the strategic default rate and the default rate under joint 
liability were much higher than those under individual lending, by 12.2 percentage 
points and 22.4 percentage points respectively. Arranging for borrowers to be informed 
of other members’ repayments does not seem to have had a strong influence on the 
strategic default rate. When participants were able to observe other members’ 
investment returns, more participants chose to default strategically but the default rate 
decreased relative to the basic joint liability games. If cross-reporting or a penalty of 3 
million points was introduced, the ratio of those who chose strategic default decreased, 
but was still higher than under individual lending. A weak social sanction (a penalty of 
1.5 million points) seemed insufficient to induce borrowers to choose repaying their 
own loans. Allowing successful borrowers to voluntarily transfer their points to 
unsuccessful borrowers in the individual lending games seems to have helped to reduce 
the default rate. As noted in the previous section, comparison between individual 
lending and joint liability lending should be based on the results of individual lending 
with voluntary transfer among group members (Row H) and that of the group lending 
with monitoring where participants were informed of other members’ repayments (Row 
D). Judged from this table, individual lending seems to be superior to joint liability 
lending in terms of both the low default rate and the low strategic default rate. 
Table 3 shows basic estimation results. The dependent variable is the dummy 
variable which takes one if the participant repaid their own loans and zero otherwise. 
Here we only use the data of those who have investment returns sufficient for 
repayment of the loan, that is, not less than 3 million points. Thus the dummy variable 
being zero means that this individual defaults strategically. As for explanatory variables, 
we include the investment return and its square value to capture the nonlinearity. We 
also include some demographic variables such as age, gender, years of education, 
riskiness, the points in the GSS questions, cooperation scale and the social connection 
index from the social networks survey. Summary statistics of these demographic 
variables are presented in the Appendix, Table 1. 
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Columns (1) to (4) provide OLS estimations.18 Demographic variables such as 
scores in GSS questions and the cooperation scale are strongly associated with an 
increase in the probability of choosing to repay the loans. Interestingly, in our 
experiment, females were more likely to choose strategic default while some other 
empirical studies show that females are more likely to repay their loans (For instance, 
see Khandker, Khalily and Kahn (1994)). Borrowers who had higher investment returns 
were more likely to repay. Age, years of education and the social connection index did 
not have any significant influence on borrowers’ repayment decisions. 
In all specifications from (1) to (4), the coefficients of joint liability are negative 
and significant at the 99% level. Individuals were about 10 to 12 percentage points more 
likely to choose strategic default under joint liability lending, relative to individual 
lending. Introducing joint liability clearly caused free-riding problems. 
The coefficient of monitoring under joint liability is not significant in the 
specification (1). If we control the other members’ investment returns, however, the 
coefficient of monitoring itself becomes significant (Column (2)) and negative, while 
higher investment returns of other members seem to induce the individual to repay 
his/her own loan. For individuals in the joint liability games, it should be critical 
whether or not total investment returns of the group members were not less than 12 
million points. In Column (3) we add a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if total 
investment returns of the group members were no less than 12 million points and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient is positive and significant as expected while other members’ 
investment returns are no longer significant. Thus individuals first considered whether 
their groups had enough investment returns and then chose to commit a strategic default 
when the total investment returns were less than 12 million points. If their groups had 
enough investment returns, then they were more likely to repay their own loans. It 
should be noted that the probability of repaying their own loan, however, was still less 
than that under the basic joint liability games, even when their total returns were no less 
than 12 million points. 
                                                 
18 We also estimate Probit and Logit models , whose results are not reported here. There are no changes 
in the results noted in the text when we employ Probit and Logit models. We only present OLS estimation 
results in order to easily compare the coefficients of OLS estimations with those of fixed effect 
estimations. All the estimation results are available upon request. 
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The effect of introducing cross-reporting and imposing penalties of 3 million 
points was almost the same. Both of these modifications decreased strategic default 
significantly, by about 8 percentage points (see Columns (2), (3) and (4)). If the penalty 
was not large enough, that is, 1.5 million points, then it does not seem to have affected 
borrowers’ behavior. 
We can see cross-reporting as the introduction of a penalty as regards 
strategically defaulting members by the bank. Where there are only a few social 
sanctions, borrowers are tempted to default strategically, leading to low repayment rates. 
In such cases, the bank can discourage borrowers from defaulting strategically and 
enhance repayment rates by introducing cross-reporting mechanisms. 
According to the OLS estimations, group formation had a positive impact on 
reducing strategic default by 6.3~8.6 percentage points, while communication had no 
significant effect, although its sign is positive and t-values are relatively large. 
In column (4) we add another dummy variable indicating individual lending 
with voluntary transfer and its intersection term with other members’ returns. The result 
shows that introducing voluntary transfer significantly increased strategic default. There 
seems no rationale to explain this result and we suspect the cause may well be related to 
the heterogeneity of participants in these games. Because participants did not participate 
in all of the games, players in the individual lending with voluntary transfer game 
happened to show an above-average tendency to default strategically. We might add 
that all the results above are also subject to similar biases. 
To exclude these individual effects, we estimate fixed effect models. The results 
are presented in Columns (5) and (6). The coefficients of joint liability and monitoring 
are unchanged and significant, confirming the negative effects of joint liability and 
monitoring on the prevention of strategic default. In the fixed effect models, group 
formation and individual lending with subcontracts are no longer significant. This 
suggests that the significance of group formation and individual lending with 
subcontracting might be due to biased distribution of participants among the games. 
Thus far we have estimated whole observations at a time. But participants’ 
behavior might be different between the first round and the following rounds because by 
the time the first rounds finished, participants had obtained some information on their 
members’ behavior and attitude. 
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Table 4 provides the result of estimation using the observations of round one and 
the following rounds separately. Almost all the results show similarity between the 
estimations for round one and the following rounds. Large differences can be found in 
the coefficients of the dummy variables for the games with penalties. In the first round, 
introduction of a penalty of 3 million points reduced strategic default, but in the 
following rounds, it does not seem to have been effective. Strangely, the fixed model 
estimation suggests that introducing a 1.5 million point penalty makes participants 11.6 
percent more likely to choose strategic default in the rounds after round one (significant 
at 95% level), while it reduces strategic default by 7.6 percent in the first round. This 
might be because those who saw other group members choosing strategic default in the 
first round, despite the penalty, felt irritated and so they themselves also chose strategic 
default in the following rounds. 
The effects of group formation are significant only in the rounds after round one. 
This might be attributable to self-selection in forming the group, as argued by Ghatak 
(1999) and Tassel (1999). Participants formed groups consisting of participants similar 
to themselves, and such groups, which consisted of those who were easily tempted to 
choose strategic default, were more likely to default in the first round. Thus only the 
groups whose members were more likely to repay their own loans survived in the 
following rounds. The result that the coefficient in the fixed effect model (Column (8)) 
is not significant supports this argument. Therefore screening out those borrowers who 
are more likely to choose strategic default could be a substantially important means of 
reducing default rates. 
 If the players cooperate with each other, it is optimal for them to share income 
risk perfectly, with the successful members providing assistance to the unsuccessful 
ones. If such transactions are not of the gift-giving type, members’ contributions, which 
are equal to the repayment of their own loans and the transfer to the other members (or 
contributions to the groups), should be correlated with the amount of assistance they 
received from others past rounds, on the principle that that those who had been helped 
by others in previous rounds help others in the present round. Table 5 provides the 
results in which we include the amounts of members’ own contributions in the previous 
round as an explanatory variable. Unlike Table 3 and 4, this Table excludes the 
observations of the basic individual lending games since in the basic individual lending 
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games, participants did not form groups and there are no elements of risk sharing among 
borrowers. Thus in Table 5, the base line case is individual lending with voluntary 
transfer. We also include the interaction term of past contributions and the dummy 
variable for the joint liability. 
The results show that the coefficients of the past contribution are negatively 
significant at the 10% level in the OLS and Probit models. This indicates that under the 
individual lending with voluntary transfer, those who had been helped in the previous 
round (those whose contributions in the past period were less) were more likely to 
choose to repay their own loans in the current round. By contrast, under joint liability, 
those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more 
likely to choose strategic default in the current round. These players were really free 
riders. Under individual lending, other members do not have to repay for such members. 
But under the joint liability lending, if members do not repay for free riders, then they 
themselves also cannot borrow money any more. Thus people have a greater incentive 
to free ride under joint liability lending. 
 Table 6 shows the results of regression where the dependent variable is the 
amount of the individuals’ contribution. As in Table 5, the observations of the basic 
individual lending games are excluded and the base line case is individual lending with 
voluntary transfer. It should be noted that unlike the previous regressions, we now use 
all observations, whereas to consider strategic default, we only use the observations of 
individuals with investment returns no less than 3 million points. 
 Columns (1) and (2) show the results using all observations. Participants were 
likely to contribute more under joint liability than under individual lending. The 
coefficients of monitoring and intersection term of monitoring and the dummy variable 
for total investment returns of the group being no less than 12 million points are 
negative and positive respectively (significant at 99% level) as in the previous tables. 
But the total contributions under joint liability with monitoring, where each member 
knows the other members’ repayments, were likely to be higher than those under 
individual lending with voluntary transfer due to the positive effects of joint liability. 
Columns (3) and (6) show the results using observations from round two 
onwards. Columns (3) and (4) use the same specification as Columns (1) and (2). In 
Columns (5) and (6) we include the amounts of their own contributions in the previous 
 22 
round and the interaction term of the past contribution and the dummy variable for the 
joint liability as explanatory variables. The tables show that when we control the 
contributions made in past rounds, then the coefficient of joint liability is no longer 
significant and the sign becomes negative. On the other hand, the coefficient of 
interaction term of the past contribution and the dummy variable for joint liability are 
positive and significant. These results might indicate that joint liability can actually 
induce borrowers to repay more to compensate for other members’ deficits but those 
who repay more are always the same individuals. As in Table 5, the coefficients of the 
past contributions are negatively significant. Thus we can conclude that the total amount 
of the contribution was larger under joint liability but those who paid large amounts 
were always the same individuals. Those who had been helped in the previous round 
also expected to be helped in the current round. On the contrary, under individual 
lending, those who were helped in the previous round tried to help others in the current 
round.  
Columns (4) and (6) also show that that introducing a penalty of 3 million points 
has a negative effect on the amount of contribution. The signs of the coefficient of 
cross-reporting in fixed effect models were also negative. This might be because most 
borrowers chose to repay and only a few members had to pay more, resulting in 
reduction in contribution relative to the cases without penalties and cross-reporting. 
 In Table 7, we report on group behavior. As in Tables 5 and 6, the base line case 
is individual lending with voluntary transfer. Columns (1), (2) and (3) indicate that 
defaults are more likely to occur under joint liability lending than under individual 
lending. The Table shows that joint liability schemes can neither reduce strategic 
defaults nor default rates. Even though joint liability lending might persuade successful 
borrowers to help unsuccessful borrowers, it also induced strategic default, which 
resulted in lower repayment rates. Introducing cross-reporting mechanisms and a 
sufficient level of penalty among borrowers can mitigate the free-riding problems. 
 Columns (4) and (5) show the results where the dependent variable is the loan 
recovery ratio, which is equal to the amount of collected repayment divided by the 
amount of loans in each group. We have found that joint liability has positive effects, a 
conclusion that is reflected in Table 6. Thus we can say that the loan recovery ratio was 
larger under joint liability but those who paid large amounts were always the same 
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individuals. We also notice that the differences in the amount of contribution and loan 
recovery ratio between the joint liability and individual lending might be due to the 
difference in the game structures: in joint liability games, borrowers can choose to repay 
1 or 2 million points while in individual lending, borrowers merely decide whether or 
not to pay 3 million points. Thus from the results of our experiments, we cannot reach a 
final conclusion concerning whether joint liability or individual lending can achieve 
higher loan recovery ratios. 
 Column (6) presents the results where the dependent variable is the variance of 
each member’s profit within groups. Our aim in this estimation is to see which schemes 
achieve a good risk-sharing performance since sharing risk perfectly is the ex ante most 
preferable contract in the context of our games. In the experiments, however, this 
cannot be achieved because of the restrictions on players’ behavior (for example, those 
whose investment returns were zero cannot obtain positive profit even when other 
members’ were willing to allow that). In the regression, we include the variance of 
investment returns within groups as an explanatory variable. 
The results show that introducing joint liability itself did not change the 
distribution of profit but introducing monitoring increased the inequality of profit 
distribution, which perhaps reflects the result that introducing monitoring makes 
borrowers more likely to choose strategic default. The positive effect of cross reporting 
is due to the fact that selfish members were excluded in the early rounds, a procedure 
that leads to reduction in variance of members’ profits in the following rounds. The 
positive and significant coefficient of variance of investment returns within groups 
indicates the imperfectness of risk sharing. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
 Our microfinance field experiments in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, suggest that 
joint liability creates serious free-riding problems and reduces repayment rates. 
Introducing penalties or a cross-reporting system would be helpful to enhance 
repayment rates, but the repayment rates and the ratios of those who did not choose 
 24 
strategic defaults were still higher under individual lending. We also find that under 
joint liability lending, people often failed in the sharing of risk: those who had been 
helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round defaulted strategically again in 
the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals. 
The opposite was true under individual lending with voluntary transfer, where risk 
sharing was achieved to a certain degree. We also find that group formation can be 
effective in the sense that it induces self-selection among borrowers and excludes those 
who are easily tempted to default strategically. 
 We also introduced penalties in order to capture the effect of social sanctions on 
the repayment decision. In this study, however, penalties were no longer exacted once 
the group ended in default. In the real world, people can punish their neighbors even 
after the default. This might explain the reason why in some specifications, the 
coefficient of the penalty of 3 million points is not significantly positive. 
Usually repayment decisions in microfinance are made through face-to-face 
communication so comparison between joint liability lending games with 
communication, and individual lending games with voluntary transfer and 
communication should be done, too. We tried to conduct individual lending games with 
voluntary transfer and communication but the participants easily became confused 
because they had to enter how much they would lend to whom on the computers. The 
best way to conduct individual lending games with subcontracting and communication 
would be to carry out experiments without computers. In this study we had to use 
computers in order to clarify how incentives work under joint liability. It will be fruitful 
to conduct another experiment without computers for purposes of comparison between 
joint liability lending games with communication and the individual lending games with 
voluntary transfer and communication. 
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Table 1. Treatment manipulations in the microfinance games 
 
Individual lending Joint liability lending 
 + Knowing other members’ repayment 
+ Monitoring & voluntary transfer among 
borrowers 
    + Monitoring 
         + Cross report 
         + Penalty of 1.5 million 
         + Penalty of 3 million 
         + Communication 
             + Cross report 
 + Group formation 
 
 
 
Table 2. Number of observations, default rates and strategic default rates in each 
manipulation 
 
Game type Observations Strategic default (choice) 
Default
(result)
A. Individual lending 1,507 8.4% 36.7%
B. Joint liability (JL) 724 20.6% 59.1%
C. JL + knowing repayment 284 19.5% 63.4%
D. JL + knowing repayment + Monitoring 628 23.4% 50.3%
E. JL + knowing repayment + Monitoring 
+ Cross- reporting 
384 18.7% 53.1%
F. JL + knowing repayment + Monitoring 
       + Penalty of 1.5 million 
240 22.1% 48.3%
G. JL + knowing repayment + Monitoring 
       + Penalty of 3 million 
320 16.5% 42.5%
H. Individual lending + voluntary transfer (ILVT) 466 13.9% 29.6%
I. JL + knowing repayment + Monitoring 
       + Communication 
120 14.0% 40.0%
J. JL + knowing repayment + Monitoring 
       + Communication + Cross report 
120 11.8% 36.7%
K. JL + knowing repayment + Monitoring 
       + Communication + Group formation 
312 6.7% 23.1%
Total  5,105 15.2% 43.8%
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Table 3. Determinants of strategic default (1) 
Dependent variable: Choose to repay the loan 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS Fixed Effect Fixed Effect
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age  0.000 
(0.05) 
 0.000
(0.04)
 0.000
(0.06)
 0.000
(-0.06)
    
Female  -0.028 
(-1.98) 
** -0.026
(-1.88)
* -0.028
(-2.05)
** -0.030
(-2.15)
**    
Years of education  -0.001 
(-0.70) 
 -0.001
(-0.77)
 -0.001
(-0.67)
 -0.001
(-0.58)
    
Riskiness -0.004 
(-0.96) 
 -0.004
(-0.94)
 -0.005
(-1.33)
 -0.005
(-1.25)
    
GSS questions 0.053 
(3.61) 
*** 0.053
(3.62)
*** 0.050
(3.48)
*** 0.050
(3.50)
***    
Cooperation scale 0.020 
(1.75) 
* 0.023
(2.05)
** 0.025
(2.25)
** 0.025
(2.25)
**    
Social connection -0.001 
(-0.38) 
 -0.001
(-0.31)
 -0.001
(-0.33)
 0.000
(0.08)
    
Investment Return 0.137 
(6.33) 
*** 0.136
(6.33)
*** 0.120
(5.60)
*** 0.122
(5.65)
*** 0.119 
(6.06) 
*** 0.119
(6.07)
***
(Investment Return)2 -0.009 
(-5.40) 
*** -0.009
(-5.42)
*** -0.008
(-4.88)
*** -0.008
(-4.95)
*** -0.008 
(-5.12) 
*** -0.008
(-5.14)
***
Other member’s 
return  
  0.001
(0.37)
 -0.003
(-0.52)
 -0.003
(-0.55)
 -0.004 
(-0.73) 
 -0.004
(-0.68)
 
Total Return ≥ 12    0.029
(1.05)
 0.030
(1.12)
 0.055 
(2.03) 
** 0.055
(2.02)
** 
Joint Liability (JL) -0.103 
(-5.36) 
*** -0.104
(-5.39)
*** -0.105
(-5.41)
*** -0.119
(-6.03)
*** -0.107 
(-5.65) 
*** -0.115
(-5.83)
***
JL_Repayment 0.012 
(0.38) 
 0.012
(0.36)
 0.013
(0.40)
 0.013
(0.40)
 0.010 
(0.32) 
 0.012
(0.41)
 
JL_Monitor  -0.040 
(-1.20) 
 -0.210
(-4.20)
*** -0.385
(-6.39)
*** -0.385
(-6.34)
*** -0.348 
(-7.31) 
*** -0.349
(-7.24)
***
Other member’s 
return * JL_Monitor  
  0.037
(4.58)
*** 0.009
(1.05)
 0.010
(1.07)
 0.010 
(1.27) 
 0.010
(1.23)
 
(Total Return ≥ 12) * 
JL_Monitor 
   0.328
(5.62)
*** 0.327
(5.61)
*** 0.290 
(6.31) 
*** 0.290
(6.31)
***
JL_CrossReport  0.072 
(2.56) 
** 0.088
(3.14)
*** 0.080
(2.90)
*** 0.082
(2.96)
*** 0.102 
(4.15) 
*** 0.101
(4.10)
***
JL_Penalty of 1.5 
million 
0.024 
(0.66) 
 0.032
(0.88)
 0.026
(0.73)
 0.025
(0.71)
 0.010 
(0.32) 
 0.010
(0.31)
 
JL_Penalty of 3 
million 
0.088 
(2.88) 
*** 0.081
(2.66)
*** 0.078
(2.62)
*** 0.077
(2.59)
** 0.084 
(2.94) 
*** 0.084
(2.91)
***
JL_Communication 0.040 
(1.30) 
 0.042
(1.44)
 0.043
(1.56)
 0.044
(1.59)
 0.048 
(1.44) 
 0.052
(1.55)
 
JL_Group Formation 0.070 
(2.04) 
** 0.086
(2.82)
*** 0.063
(2.10)
** 0.063
(2.09)
** 0.044 
(0.95) 
 0.040
(0.85)
 
Individual lending + 
voluntary transfer 
(ILVT) 
    -0.084
(-1.96)
*   -0.051
(-1.08)
 
Other members’ 
return * ILVT 
    0.006
(0.61)
   0.003
(0.27)
 
         
Observations 3521  3521  3521  3521  3559  3559  
R-squared 0.07  0.09  0.11  0.11  0.08  0.08  
t-values in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable for all regressions is “choose to repay the loan”, where the value is equal to one if the individual 
repays his/her own loan. 
Specifications (1), (2), (3) and (4) include district dummy, which is not reported in the table.
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Table 4. Determinants of strategic default (2) 
Dependent variable: Choose to repay the loan 
 Round=1 Round>1 
 OLS Probit Logit Fixed Effect OLS Probit Logit Fixed Effect
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Age  0.001 
(2.17) 
** 0.008 
(2.37) 
** 0.013 
(2.08)
** 
 
 -0.002 
(-2.61)
*** -0.009 
(-2.47) 
** -0.017 
(-2.59) 
**
 
 
Female  -0.025 
(-1.28) 
 -0.107 
(-1.34) 
  -0.197 
(-1.35)
  
 
 -0.028 
(-1.50)
  -0.130 
(-1.36) 
  -0.239 
(-1.31) 
  
 
 
Years of 
education  
-0.003 
(-1.10) 
 -0.012 
(-1.17) 
  -0.020 
(-1.11)
  
 
 0.002 
(0.71)
  0.013 
(1.05) 
  0.023 
(1.00) 
  
 
 
Riskiness -0.010 
(-1.67) 
* -0.046 
(-1.93) 
* -0.076 
(-1.75)
* 
 
 -0.001 
(-0.13)
  -0.006 
(-0.19) 
  -0.017 
(-0.30) 
  
 
 
GSS questions 0.054 
(2.69) 
*** 0.230 
(2.80) 
*** 0.417 
(2.87)
***
 
 0.048 
(2.42)
** 0.264 
(2.71) 
*** 0.463 
(2.56) 
**
 
 
Cooperation 
scale 
0.042 
(2.55) 
** 0.175 
(2.58) 
** 0.333 
(2.79)
***
 
 0.003 
(0.21)
  0.014 
(0.18) 
  0.043 
(0.29) 
  
 
 
Social 
connection 
0.001 
(0.45) 
 0.013 
(0.93) 
  0.019 
(0.71)
  
 
 -0.001 
(-0.40)
  -0.004 
(-0.25) 
  -0.010 
(-0.34) 
  
 
 
Investment 
Return 
0.102 
(3.32) 
*** 0.440 
(3.47) 
*** 0.734 
(3.21)
*** 0.123 
(4.21)
*** 0.144 
(4.82)
*** 0.697 
(4.94) 
*** 1.248 
(4.69) 
*** 0.108 
(3.53)
***
(Investment 
Return)2 
-0.007 
(-2.83) 
*** -0.030 
(-2.82) 
*** -0.049 
(-2.58)
** -0.009 
(-3.59)
*** -0.010 
(-4.31)
*** -0.049 
(-4.21) 
*** -0.087 
(-3.93) 
*** -0.007 
(-2.91)
***
Other member’s 
return  
-0.007 
(-0.98) 
 -0.030 
(-0.89 ) 
  -0.051 
(-0.86)
  -0.015 
(-1.89)
* 0.004
(0.52)
  0.019 
(0.40) 
  0.033 
(0.37) 
  0.005 
(0.50)
  
Total Return ≥ 
12 
0.007 
(0.13) 
 0.001 
(0.00) 
  -0.024 
(-0.06)
  0.015 
(0.29)
  0.039 
(1.13)
  0.313 
(1.55) 
  0.556 
(1.39) 
  0.090 
(2.31)
** 
Joint Liability 
(JL) 
-0.125 
(-4.98) 
*** -0.588 
(-5.07) 
*** -1.121 
(-5.14)
*** -0.117 
(-4.72)
*** -0.113 
(-3.62)
*** -0.668 
(-3.98) 
*** -1.273 
(-4.00) 
*** -0.134 
(-3.29)
***
JL_Repayment 0.008 
(0.18) 
 0.018 
(0.12) 
  0.053 
(0.20)
  0.025 
(0.68)
  0.030 
(0.56)
  0.133 
(0.56) 
  0.307 
(0.69) 
  0.053 
(0.93)
  
JL_Monitor  -0.295 
(-3.09) 
*** -1.013 
(-3.06) 
*** -1.708 
(-2.88)
*** -0.372 
(-4.67)
*** -0.481 
(-5.80)
*** -1.394 
(-4.25) 
*** -2.369 
(-3.86) 
*** -0.422 
(-5.35)
***
Other members’ 
return *JL_Moni 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
 -0.009 
(-0.16) 
  -0.031 
(-0.30)
  0.016 
(1.29)
  0.023 
(1.90)
* 0.128 
(1.93) 
* 0.228 
(1.76) 
* 0.011 
(0.81)
  
(Total Return ≥ 
12) * JL_Moni 
0.303 
(3.28) 
*** 1.041 
(3.14) 
*** 1.835 
(3.04)
*** 0.255 
(3.25)
*** 0.346 
(4.66)
*** 0.677 
(2.26) 
** 1.080 
(1.92) 
* 0.340 
(4.91)
***
JL_CrossRepor
t  
0.082 
(2.22) 
** 0.309 
(2.20) 
** 0.565 
(2.25)
** 0.118 
(3.71)
*** 0.074 
(1.73)
* 0.380 
(1.92) 
* 0.629 
(1.68) 
* 0.055 
(1.18)
  
JL_Penalty of 
1.5 million 
0.060 
(1.25) 
 0.250 
(1.39) 
  0.447 
(1.37)
  0.076 
(1.82)
* -0.047 
(-0.91)
  -0.173 
(-0.86) 
  -0.330 
(-0.91) 
  -0.116 
(-2.17)
** 
JL_Penalty of 3 
million 
0.124 
(2.95) 
*** 0.515 
(2.80) 
*** 0.944 
(2.81)
*** 0.173 
(4.34)
*** 0.002 
(0.04)
  0.039 
(0.21) 
  0.003 
(0.01) 
  -0.035 
(-0.71)
  
JL_Communica
tion 
0.054 
(1.45) 
 0.265 
(1.21) 
  0.405 
(0.98)
  0.077 
(1.62)
  0.017 
(0.40)
  0.064 
(0.31) 
  0.107 
(0.28) 
  -0.002 
(-0.04)
  
JL_Group 
Formation 
0.011 
(0.23) 
 -0.012 
(-0.04) 
  -0.024 
(-0.04)
  0.032 
(0.46)
  0.105 
(2.34)
** 0.793 
(2.75) 
*** 1.477 
(2.74) 
*** 0.076 
(1.00)
  
ILVT -0.293 
(-2.90) 
*** -1.413 
(-3.55) 
*** -2.515 
(-3.65)
*** -0.274 
(-2.70)
*** -0.013 
(-0.27)
  -0.074 
(-0.29) 
  -0.173 
(-0.36) 
  0.031 
(0.50)
  
Other members’ 
return * ILVT 
0.048 
(2.49) 
** 0.231 
(2.72) 
*** 0.400 
(2.69)
*** 0.054 
(2.51)
** -0.013 
(-1.06)
  -0.090 
(-1.31) 
  -0.158 
(-1.25) 
  -0.026 
(-1.71)
* 
                      
Observations 1884  1884  1884 1908 1637 1637  1637 1651 
R-squared 0.10  0.12  0.12 0.05 0.16 0.17  0.17 0.13 
t-values in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable for all regressions is “choose to repay the loan”, where the value is equal to one if the individual repays 
his/her own loan. 
Specifications (1), (2), (3), (5), (6) and (7) include district dummy, which is not reported in the table.
 30 
Table 5. Determinants of strategic default (3) 
Dependent variable: Choose to repay the loan 
 OLS Probit Logit Fixed Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age  -0.003 
(-2.77) 
*** -0.013 
(-2.76)
*** -0.023 
(-2.74)
*** 
 
 
Female  -0.031 
(-1.29) 
  -0.136 
(-1.20)
  -0.241 
(-1.13)
  
 
 
Years of education  0.004 
(1.48) 
  0.028 
(1.87)
* 0.048 
(1.80)
* 
 
 
Riskiness -0.007 
(-0.97) 
  -0.031 
(-0.92)
  -0.058 
(-0.92)
  
 
 
GSS questions 0.069 
(2.55) 
** 0.330 
(2.80)
*** 0.556 
(2.62)
** 
 
 
Cooperation scale 0.005 
(0.27) 
  0.047 
(0.51)
  0.102 
(0.58)
  
 
 
Social connection -0.003 
(-0.76) 
  -0.014 
(-0.75)
  -0.029 
(-0.84)
  
 
 
Investment Return 0.145 
(3.82) 
*** 0.654 
(3.84)
*** 1.181 
(3.73)
*** 0.091 
(2.30) 
** 
(Investment Return)2 -0.010 
(-3.33) 
*** -0.044 
(-3.16)
*** -0.079 
(-3.04)
*** -0.006 
(-1.74) 
* 
Other member’s return  -0.003 
(-0.29) 
  -0.028
(-0.50)
  -0.028 
(-0.27)
  -0.006 
(-0.49) 
  
Total Return ≥ 12 0.022 
(0.34) 
  0.186 
(0.62)
  0.224 
(0.40)
  0.04 
(0.59) 
  
Joint Liability (JL) -0.185 
(-2.86) 
*** -0.964 
(-2.70)
*** -1.768 
(-2.69)
** -0.109 
(-1.27) 
  
JL_Repayment 0.044 
(0.80) 
  0.178 
(0.74)
  0.381 
(0.84)
  0.058 
(0.85) 
  
JL_Monitor  -0.546 
(-5.83) 
*** -1.829 
(-4.85)
*** -3.161 
(-4.45)
*** -0.507 
(-5.17) 
*** 
Other member’s return * 
JL_Monitor  
0.030 
(2.13) 
** 0.177 
(2.40)
** 0.296 
(2.14)
** 0.018 
(1.04) 
  
(Total Return ≥ 12) * 
JL_Monitor 
0.361 
(3.96) 
*** 0.858 
(2.28)
** 1.507 
(2.18)
** 0.426 
(4.62) 
*** 
JL_CrossReport  0.091 
(2.00) 
** 0.439 
(2.13)
** 0.759 
(1.93)
** 0.050 
(0.91) 
  
JL_Penalty of 1.5 
million 
-0.043 
(-0.83) 
  -0.167 
(-0.81)
  -0.298 
(-0.81)
  -0.128 
(-2.09) 
** 
JL_Penalty of 3 million 0.016 
(0.38) 
  0.094 
(0.48)
  0.112 
(0.31)
  -0.045 
(-0.79) 
  
JL_Communication 0.013 
(0.31) 
  0.045 
(0.21)
  0.062 
(0.16)
  -0.016 
(-0.22) 
  
JL_Group Formation 0.092 
(2.03) 
** 0.751 
(2.59)
** 1.382 
(2.53)
** -0.026 
(-0.26) 
  
Past Contribution -0.031 
(-1.76) 
* -0.166 
(-1.82)
* -0.290 
(-1.78)
  -0.030 
(-1.42) 
  
JL*Past Contribution 0.048 
(2.41) 
** 0.252 
(2.56)
** 0.447 
(2.51)
** 0.033 
(1.45) 
  
            
Observations 1108  1108 1108 1116  
R-squared 0.20  0.20 0.20 0.13  
t-values in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Dependent variable for all regressions is “choose to repay the loan”, where the value is equal to one if the individual 
repays his/her own loan. 
Specifications (1), (2), (3) and (4) include district dummy, which is not reported in the table.
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Table 6. Determinants of the amount of contributions 
Dependent variable: Contribution 
 All rounds Round>1 
 OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age  -0.003 
(-1.39) 
  -0.010
(-3.37)
***
 
 -0.010 
(-3.37) 
*** 
 
 
Female -0.089 
(-1.70) 
*  -0.074
(-0.99)
 
 
 -0.084 
(-1.13) 
 
 
 
Years of education  -0.007 
(-1.04) 
  0.003
(0.35)
 
 
 0.004 
(0.41) 
 
 
 
Riskiness -0.008 
(-0.52) 
  0.012
(0.56)
 
 
 0.008 
(0.39) 
 
 
 
GSS questions 0.179 
(3.26) 
***  0.190
(2.37)
**
 
 0.189 
(2.36) 
** 
 
 
Cooperation scale 0.044 
(1.01) 
  -0.022
(-0.37)
 
 
 -0.028 
(-0.46) 
 
 
 
Social connection -0.004 
(-0.47) 
  -0.011
(-1.08)
 
 
 -0.010 
(-0.96) 
 
 
 
Investment Return 0.801 
(31.23) 
*** 0.831
(29.29)
*** 0.775
(21.29)
*** 0.784
(17.61)
*** 0.766 
(21.04) 
*** 0.779
(17.50)
***
(Investment Return)2 -0.044 
(-14.18) 
*** -0.046
(-15.46)
*** -0.041
(-9.30)
*** -0.040
(-8.67)
*** -0.040 
(-9.15) 
*** -0.040
(-8.58)
***
Other member’s 
return  
-0.150 
(-5.40) 
*** -0.161
(-6.61)
*** -0.135
(-3.43)
*** -0.167
(-4.10)
*** -0.135 
(-3.42) 
*** -0.162
(-3.97)
***
Total Return ≥ 12 0.528 
(4.20) 
*** 0.593
(4.96)
*** 0.542
(2.98)
*** 0.609
(3.28)
*** 0.535 
(2.94) 
*** 0.588
(3.16)
***
Joint Liability (JL) 0.253 
(2.94) 
*** 0.210
(2.21)
** 0.334
(2.64)
*** 0.380
(2.29)
** -0.276 
(-1.23) 
 -0.080
(-0.29)
 
JL_Repayment -0.039 
(-0.41) 
 0.062
(0.64)
 -0.032
(-0.21)
 0.021
(0.11)
 -0.040 
(-0.26) 
 0.021
(0.11)
 
JL_Monitor -0.606 
(-3.79) 
*** -0.589
(-3.80)
*** -0.702
(-2.91)
*** -0.559
(-2.13)
** -0.701 
(-2.91) 
*** -0.559
(-2.13)
** 
Other member’s 
return * JL_Monitor 
0.030 
(0.80) 
 0.038
(1.19)
 0.014
(0.28)
 -0.012
(-0.23)
 0.017 
(0.32) 
 -0.018
(-0.35)
 
(Total Return ≥ 12) * 
JL_Monitor 
0.515 
(3.24) 
*** 0.432
(2.86)
*** 0.582
(2.56)
** 0.737
(3.14)
*** 0.570 
(2.51) 
** 0.768
(3.27)
***
JL_CrossReport 0.229 
(2.79) 
*** 0.198
(2.55)
** 0.203
(1.52)
 -0.085
(-0.56)
 0.202 
(1.51) 
 -0.091
(-0.60)
 
JL_Penalty of 1.5 
million 
0.088 
(0.78) 
 0.080
(0.79)
 -0.084
(-0.52)
 -0.136
(-0.74)
 -0.086 
(-0.53) 
 -0.141
(-0.77)
 
JL_Penalty of  3 
million 
0.033 
(0.38) 
 -0.010
(-0.10)
 -0.154
(-1.27)
 -0.486
(-2.85)
*** -0.160 
(-1.32) 
 -0.481
(-2.82)
***
JL_Communication -0.014 
(-0.17) 
 0.080
(0.69)
 0.080
(0.65)
 0.259
(1.31)
 0.086 
(0.69) 
 0.265
(1.34)
 
JL_Group Formation 0.290 
(2.98) 
*** 0.81
(0.50)
 0.364
(2.64)
*** -0.113
(-0.42)
 0.380 
(2.77) 
*** -0.124
(-0.46)
 
Past Contribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.134 
(-2.17) 
** -0.155
(-2.31)
** 
JL* Past 
Contribution  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.205 
(3.06) 
*** 0.147
(2.07)
** 
             
Observations 3553  3598 1605 1618  1605  1618  
R-squared 0.51  0.51 0.56 0.55  0.57  0.55  
t-values in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Specifications (1) ,(3) and (5) include district dummy, which is not reported in the table.
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Table 7. Determinants of group performance 
Dependent variable Not default Loan recovery (OLS) Var(Profit) 
 OLS Probit Logit All rounds Round 1 only OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age (Average) 0.000 
(0.12) 
  0.001 
(0.13)
  0.001 
(0.09)
  -0.001 
(-0.73)
  0.003 
(1.86) 
* 0.025 
(0.94)
  
Female ratio -0.014 
(-0.27) 
  -0.046 
(-0.28)
  -0.063 
(-0.23)
  -0.021 
(-0.77)
  0.019 
(0.49) 
  1.652 
(2.51)
** 
Years of education  
(Average) 
0.006 
(0.80) 
  0.018 
(0.72)
  0.033 
(0.79)
  0.005 
(1.06)
  0.006 
(1.01) 
  0.058 
(0.52)
  
Riskiness  
(Average) 
0.031 
(1.69) 
* 0.096 
(1.68)
* 0.164 
(1.71)
* 0.002 
(0.19)
  0.006 
(0.41) 
  0.057 
(0.27)
  
GSS questions 
(Average) 
0.226 
(4.22) 
*** 0.708 
(4.07)
*** 1.158 
(4.00)
*** 0.120 
(3.80)
*** 0.134 
(2.95) 
*** -1.072 
(-1.39)
  
Cooperation scale 
(Average) 
-0.045 
(-0.94) 
  -0.189 
(-1.24)
  -0.269 
(-1.04)
  0.046 
(1.69)
* 0.064 
(1.62) 
  -1.204 
(-2.16)
** 
Social connection 
(Average) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
  -0.003 
(-0.15)
  0.000 
(0.01)
  -0.002 
(-0.61)
  0.002 
(0.56) 
  0.035 
(0.42)
  
Investment Return  
(Average) 
0.069 
(4.79) 
*** 0.184 
(4.57)
*** 0.313 
(4.43)
*** 0.077 
(9.84)
*** 0.078 
(6.96) 
*** 1.165 
(5.20)
***
Var (Investment 
Return)  
    
 
 0.320 
(6.87)
***
Total Return ≥ 12 0.168 
(2.85) 
*** 0.573 
(3.13)
*** 0.907 
(2.85)
*** 0.236 
(7.01)
*** 0.152 
(2.83) 
*** -1.694 
(-2.23)
** 
Joint Liability (JL) -0.094 
(-2.16) 
** -0.253 
(-2.06)
** -0.395 
(-1.98)
** 0.074 
(3.50)
*** 0.060 
(1.91) 
* -0.246 
(-0.38)
  
JL_Repayment -0.028 
(-0.45) 
  -0.079 
(-0.42)
  -0.143 
(-0.47)
  -0.014 
(-0.47)
  -0.023 
(-0.59) 
  0.452 
(0.69)
  
JL_Monitor  -0.334 
(-4.28) 
*** -2.469 
(-5.11)
*** -4.621 
(-4.30)
*** -0.162 
(-3.50)
*** -0.173 
(-2.52) 
** 3.145 
(3.09)
***
Average return * 
JL_Monitor  
0.075 
(3.37) 
*** 0.319 
(3.83)
*** 0.563 
(3.68)
*** 0.001 
(0.10)
  -0.001 
(-0.04) 
  -0.344 
(-1.25)
  
(Total Return ≥ 12) 
* JL_Monitor 
0.099 
(1.23) 
  1.215 
(2.60)
*** 2.416 
(2.25)
** 0.187 
(3.63)
*** 0.232 
(2.94) 
*** -1.607 
(-1.60)
  
JL_CrossReport  0.121 
(2.39) 
** 0.475 
(2.53)
** 0.767 
(2.40)
** 0.072 
(2.92)
*** 0.079 
(2.46) 
** -1.652 
(-3.27)
***
JL_Penalty of 1.5 
million 
0.075 
(1.16) 
  0.340 
(1.49)
  0.531 
(1.38)
  0.044 
(1.30)
  0.097 
(2.07) 
** 1.043 
(1.31)
  
JL_Penalty of 3 
million 
0.085 
(1.50) 
  0.362 
(1.83)
* 0.570 
(1.74)
* 0.015 
(0.50)
  0.087 
(2.25) 
** -0.797 
(-1.35)
  
JL_Communication 0.128 
(2.20) 
** 0.602 
(2.42)
** 1.004 
(2.27)
** 0.001 
(0.02)
  -0.028 
(-0.65) 
  -0.261 
(-0.48)
  
JL_GroupFormation 0.123 
(1.74) 
* 0.359 
(1.12)
  0.678 
(1.14)
  0.068 
(1.83)
* 0.036 
(0.57) 
  -0.745 
(-1.15)
  
district1  -0.064 
(-1.12) 
  -0.209 
(-1.18)
  -0.341 
(-1.15)
  -0.087 
(-3.00)
*** -0.066 
(-1.63) 
  1.756 
(2.44)
** 
district2  -0.180 
(-2.78) 
*** -0.609 
(-2.89)
*** -1.011 
(-2.87)
*** -0.085 
(-2.55)
** -0.046 
(-0.98) 
  1.401 
(1.87)
* 
             
Observations 1352  1352 1352  1352 617  865  
R-squared 0.23  0.20 0.20  0.49 0.44  0.36  
t-values in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table 1. Summary statistics of demographic characteristics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age  33.323 13.60 15 76
Female  0.587 0.49 0 1
Years of education  9.207 4.56 0 16
Riskiness * 2.946 1.51 1 5
GSS questions 0.332 0.46 -1 1
Cooperation scale 1.368 0.54 -0.6 2.4
Social connection 3.753 3.51 0 19
* Riskiness: 1 = most risk averse; 5 = least risk averse 
 
 
